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system, which features multiple patent policy instruments. In this sur-
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a canonical Schumpeterian growth model to demonstrate their di¤erent
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1 Introduction
In this survey, we provide a selective review of the literature on patent policy,
innovation and economic growth. The seminal work of Solow (1956) shows an
important result that in the long run, economic growth is driven by technological
progress, which in turn is driven by R&D and innovation. However, R&D fea-
tures externalities, which cause the market equilibrium level of R&D investment
to deviate from its socially optimal level. Jones and Williams (1998, 2000) show
that the market economy tends to exhibit a signicant degree of R&D underin-
vestment.
As a result of this market failure, government intervention is required to
stimulate R&D in the economy. An important policy tool of the government
is the patent system. However, the patent system is a multi-dimensional policy
system in the sense that it features multiple patent policy instruments. In this
survey, we review some of the commonly discussed patent policy instruments in
the literature on patent policy and innovation-driven growth.
This literature is based on the literature on innovation and economic growth.
The seminal study by Romer (1990) develops the rst R&D-based growth model
in which innovation comes from new product development. Then, Aghion and
Howitt (1992) develop the Schumpeterian growth model in which innovation
comes from quality improvement; see also Grossman and Helpman (1991) and
Segerstrom et al. (1990) for other early studies.1 In this survey, we use a canoni-
cal Schumpeterian growth model to demonstrate the theoretical e¤ects of various
patent policy instruments on innovation, economic growth and income inequal-
ity.2
The patent policy instruments that we review in this survey include patent
length, patent breadth and blocking patents. Patent length refers to the statutory
term of patent, which is 20 years in most countries. Patent breadth refers to the
scope or broadness of patent protection, which is determined by how broadly
patent claims are interpreted by patent judges when patents are enforced in
courts. Blocking patents refer to patentholders blocking subsequent innovation
and extracting surplus from subsequent innovators. In summary, we nd that
extending patent length is ine¤ective in stimulating R&D whereas increasing
patent breadth may have a positive e¤ect on innovation and economic growth
but also worsen income inequality. Finally, blocking patents are detrimental to
innovation and economic growth.
The rest of this survey is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the di¤erent
1See Aghion et al. (2014) for a survey on Schumpeterian growth theory.
2There is also an empirical literature on patent policy and innovation; see Park (2008) for a
survey. In this literature, empirical studies are mostly based on an aggregate measure of patent
rights developed by Ginarte and Park (1997).
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e¤ects of various patent policy instruments on innovation. Section 3 considers
how patent policy a¤ects inequality. Section 4 concludes.
2 Patent policy and innovation
In this section, we explore the di¤erent e¤ects of various patent policy instru-
ments. Section 2.1 considers patent length. Section 2.2 analyzes patent breadth
in a Schumpeterian growth model. Section 2.3 extends the model to allow for
blocking patents. Section 2.4 discusses other patent policy instruments.
2.1 Patent length
We begin our analysis of patent policy by considering patent length, which refers
to the statutory term of patent. The seminal study on the analysis of optimal
patent length is Nordhaus (1969), who considers a tradeo¤ between the social ben-
et of innovation and the social cost of monopolistic distortion in a partial equilib-
rium model. Subsequent studies by Judd (1985), Iwaisako and Futagami (2003),
Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) and Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) explore optimal
patent length in dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) models.3 Judd (1985) nds
that an innite patent length is optimal by eliminating a relative-price distortion,
whereas Iwaisako and Futagami (2003) and Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) nd
that the optimal patent length is nite due to the presence of an additional distor-
tion on the allocation of intermediate goods. Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) pro-
vide a quantitative analysis on optimal patent length in a Schumpeterian growth
model with step-by-step innovation developed by Aghion et al. (2001) and show
that the optimal patent length is nite and state-dependent (depending on the
technological gaps between industry leaders and their followers).
Although patent length seems to be a natural and relevant patent policy
instrument to consider, Pakes (1986) and Schankerman and Pakes (1986) show
that most patents are not renewed until the end of the statutory term of 20 years.
Therefore, extending the patent length is unlikely to have a signicant e¤ect in
stimulating R&D. In the rest of this section, we demonstrate the intuition of this
nding from Chu (2010a).
Let v0(T ) denote the value of an invention patented at time 0 with a patent
length of T years. Let t = 0 exp(gt) denote that the prot ow generated by
the patented invention at time t, and g is the rate of change in the prot ow
3See also Chou and Shy (1993) who explore a crowding-out e¤ect of patent length on inno-
vation by decreasing the young generations saving in an overlapping generations model.
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t. Then, no arbitrage implies that v0(T ) is the present value of t from time 0
to time T given by
v0(T ) =
Z T
0
e rttdt =
Z T
0
e (r g)t0dt =
1  e (r g)T
r   g
0, (1)
where r is the interest rate and also the discount rate of future prots. Then, we
can compute the percent change in v0(T ) when the patent length increases from
T years to T +  years as
v0 
v0(T + )  v0(T )
v0(T )
=
e (r g)T   e (r g)(T+)
1  e (r g)T
, (2)
which shows that v0 crucially depends on the values of g and r.
Bessen (2008) estimates that the annual depreciate rate of prot generated
by patents is about 14% (i.e., g =  0:14). Therefore, we consider a range of
values for g from  0:2 to  0:1. Given these values for g and an asset return r
of 7%, the percent changes in patent value v0 from extending the patent length
from 20 years to 25 years are very small and range from 0:3% to 2:0%. However,
shortening the patent length from 20 years to 15 years would reduce patent value
by  1:3% to  4:6%, which are more signicant. Chu (2010a) extends the R&D-
based growth model developed by Romer (1990) to allow for nite patent length
and calibrates the model to data (including the above estimate of g) to show
that the e¤ects of extending the patent length beyond 20 years on R&D and
economic growth are quantitatively insignicant.
2.2 Patent breath
Given the ine¤ectiveness of patent length in stimulating R&D, we consider in this
section an alternative patent policy instrument known as patent breadth, which
refers to the scope or broadness of patent protection. Early studies by Gilbert
and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990) explore the e¤ects of patent breadth
in partial equilibrium models. Subsequent studies by Li (2001), Goh and Olivier
(2002), ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) and Chu (2011) explore the e¤ects of
patent breadth in DGE models of economic growth and innovation.
We rst demonstrate how patent breadth a¤ects the value of patents. For
simplicity, we set the patent length T to innity in order to simplify (1) as
v() =
()
r   g
, (3)
where  captures the level of patent breadth. A larger patent breadth increases
the amount of prot  generated by a patent, which in turn increases its value
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v. Equation (3) implies that the percent change in patent value is determined by
the percent change in the amount of prot. Therefore, the key di¤erence between
patent length and patent breadth is that patent length a¤ects future prot gen-
erated by a patent whereas patent breadth also a¤ects its current prot, which in
turn has a more direct e¤ect on the value of patents. In the rest of this section,
we use a canonical Schumpeterian growth model to provide a microfoundation
for the prot function () being increasing in patent breadth  and demonstrate
the e¤ects of patent breadth on innovation and economic growth.
2.2.1 A canonical Schumpeterian growth model with patent breadth
The Schumpeterian growth model is developed by Aghion and Howitt (1992). In
this model, innovation is driven by the quality improvement of products. Here we
develop a simple version of the Schumpeterian growth model with patent breadth.
2.2.2 Household
There is a representative household, which has the following utility function:
U =
Z
1
0
e t ln ctdt, (4)
where the parameter  > 0 is the subjective discount rate of the household and
ct denotes consumption at time t. The household inelastically supplies L units
of labor for production and maximizes utility subject to the following asset-
accumulation equation:
_at = rtat + wtL  ct, (5)
where at is the value of assets (i.e., patented inventions), rt is the interest rate,
and wt is the wage rate. Dynamic optimization yields the consumption path as
_ct
ct
= rt   . (6)
2.2.3 Final good
Competitive rms produce nal good yt using a Cobb-Douglas aggregator:
yt = N exp

1
N
Z N
0
ln xt(i)di

, (7)
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where N is the (exogenous) number of di¤erentiated intermediate goods xt(i) for
i 2 [0; N ].4 Prot maximization yields the conditional demand function for xt(i)
as
pt(i)xt(i) =
yt
N
, (8)
where pt(i) is the price of xt(i).
2.2.4 Intermediate goods
There areN monopolistic industries. Each monopolistic industry is dominated by
a temporary industry leader (who owns the latest innovation in the industry) until
the arrival of the next innovation. The industry leader in industry i produces the
di¤erentiated intermediate good xt(i). The production function of the industry
leader in industry i 2 [0; N ] is
xt(i) = z
qt(i)Lt(i), (9)
where the parameter z > 1 is the quality step size, qt(i) is the number of quality
improvements that have occurred in industry i as of time t, and Lt(i) is production
labor employed in industry i.
Given the productivity level zqt(i), the marginal cost of the leader in industry i
is wt=z
qt(i). From the Bertrand competition between the current industry leader
and the previous industry leader, the prot-maximizing price for the current
industry leader is
pt(i) = 
wt
zqt(i)
, (10)
where the markup  2 (1; z) is a patent policy parameter determined by the gov-
ernment. Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) assume
that the markup  is equal to the quality step size z, due to the assumption of
complete patent protection on the latest innovation. Here we follow Li (2001) to
consider incomplete patent breadth such that  < z.
The wage payment in industry i is
wtLt(i) =
1

pt(i)xt(i) =
1

yt
N
, (11)
and the monopolistic prot in industry i is
t(i) = pt(i)xt(i)  wtLt(i) =
  1

yt
N
, (12)
which is increasing in the level of patent breadth  (providing a microfoundation
for () in Section 2.2).
4We include N as a parameter to demonstrate some recent results in the literature.
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2.2.5 R&D
Equation (12) shows that t(i) = t. Therefore, the value of inventions is sym-
metric across industries such that vt(i) = vt for i 2 [0; N ]; see Cozzi et al.
(2007) for a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium. Then, the
no-arbitrage condition that determines vt is
rt =
t + _vt   tvt
vt
. (13)
Intuitively, the no-arbitrage condition equates the interest rate rt to the rate of
return on vt given by the sum of monopolistic prot t, capital gain _vt and ex-
pected capital loss tvt, where t is the arrival rate of innovation. When the next
innovation occurs, the previous technology becomes obsolete; see Cozzi (2007)
for a discussion on this Arrow replacement e¤ect.
Competitive entrepreneurs maximize prot by devoting Rt units of nal good
to perform innovation. The arrival rate of innovation is
t =
'Rt
Zt
, (14)
where ' > 0 is an R&D productivity parameter and Zt denotes the aggregate
level of technology, which captures an increasing-di¢culty e¤ect of R&D. The
free-entry condition for R&D is
tvt = Rt ,
'vt
Zt
= 1, (15)
where the second equality uses (14).
2.2.6 Economic growth
Aggregate technology Zt is dened as
Zt  exp

1
N
Z N
0
qt(i)di ln z

= exp
Z t
0
!d! ln z

, (16)
which uses the law of large numbers and equates the average number of quality
improvements 1
N
R N
0
qt(i)di that have occurred as of time t to the average number
of innovation arrivals
R t
0
!d! up to time t. Di¤erentiating the log of Zt with
respect to time yields the growth rate of technology given by
gt 
_Zt
Zt
= t ln z. (17)
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Substituting (9) into (7) yields the aggregate production function given by
yt = N exp

1
N
Z N
0
qt(i)di ln z +
1
N
Z N
0
lnLt(i)di

= ZtL, (18)
where we have used the symmetry condition L(i) = L=N . Therefore, the growth
rate of nal good yt is also gt, which is determined by t as in (17).
Using _ct=ct = gt and (6) in (13), we derive the balanced-growth value of an
invention as
vt =
t
+ 
=
  1

Zt
+ 
L
N
, (19)
which uses (12) and (18). Equation (19) shows that vt is increasing in level of
patent breadth . Substituting (19) into (15) yields
 =
  1

'L
N
  , (20)
which is the steady-state arrival rate of innovation. Equation (20) shows that
the steady-state arrival rate  of innovation is increasing in the level of patent
breadth . Therefore, the steady-state growth rate g =  ln z is also increasing
in the level of patent breadth . Proposition 1 summarizes this result.
Proposition 1 Economic growth is increasing in the level of patent breadth.
This result originates from Li (2001), which is the rst study that consid-
ers patent breadth in the Schumpeterian growth model. Subsequent studies by
Goh and Olivier (2002), Chu (2011) and Saito (2017) explore sector-specic op-
timal patent breadth in the presence of multiple R&D sectors and analyze which
sector-specic characteristics call for a higher level of patent breadth. Iwaisako
(2020) performs a quantitative analysis on optimal patent breadth in the semi-
endogenous-growth version of the Schumpeterian model in Segerstrom (1998) and
Li (2003).
2.2.7 Negative e¤ects of patent breadth on innovation
Although early studies tend to nd that increasing patent breadth has a positive
e¤ect on economic growth and innovation, recent studies discover negative e¤ects
of patent breadth via various general-equilibrium channels. For example, Chu,
Furukawa and Ji (2016) show that although patent breadth  increases economic
growth in the short run when the number of di¤erentiated products N is xed, a
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larger  reduces economic growth in the long run when N becomes endogenous.
Intuitively, a larger patent breadth increases the amount of monopolistic prots
and attracts the entry of new products. In this case, we can assume that the
number of di¤erentiated products N is an increasing function in  and modify
(20) as
 =
  1

'L
N()
  . (21)
Then, a larger  has a positive e¤ect on innovation via the prot margin ( 1)=
and a negative e¤ect on innovation via a larger number of products N(). This
latter e¤ect dilutes the amount of resources for the innovation of each product.
Chu, Furukawa and Ji (2016) and Chu, Kou and Wang (2020) show that this
negative e¤ect of patent breadth  dominates its positive e¤ect on the steady-
state equilibrium growth rate in the Schumpeterian growth model with both
quality improvement and new product development in Peretto (2007, 2015).
In the literature, there are also other general-equilibrium channels through
which patent breadth causes negative e¤ects on innovation and economic growth.
For example, Chu, Cozzi, Fan, Pan and Zhang (2020) consider an R&D-based
growth model with credit constraints and show that the distortionary e¤ect
caused by a larger patent breadth could tighten the credit constraints and sti-
e innovation. They also provide empirical evidence for this theoretical result.
Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) develop a growth model with both innovation
and capital accumulation to show that patent breadth has a positive e¤ect on
innovation but a negative e¤ect on capital accumulation, generating an overall
inverted-U e¤ect on economic growth.
2.3 Blocking patents
ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) refer to the modelling of patent breadth in
Li (2001) as lagging breadth because it protects the current industry leader from
the previous industry leader but not future industry leaders. Therefore, they
propose an additional form of patent breadth known as leading breadth, which
protects the current industry leader against subsequent innovators. ODonoghue
and Zweimuller (2004) introduce a general formulation of leading patent breadth
to the Schumpeterian growth model. Here we provide a simple formulation based
on Chu and Pan (2013).
In each industry, the latest industry leader (i.e., the entrant) infringes the
patent of the previous industry leader (i.e., the incumbent). Due to this patent
infringement, the entrant has to transfer a share s 2 (0; 1) of her monopolistic
prot to the incumbent. Therefore, the prot share s captures the strength of
blocking patents. Due to the division of prot, the entrant obtains (1   s)t
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as her prot at time t, whereas the incumbent obtains st as her prot. When
the next innovation arrives, the current entrant becomes the incumbent and her
prot changes from (1   s)t to st, whereas the current incumbent loses her
claim to the prot generated by the next entrant. In other words, we assume
that the degree of leading patent breadth covers only the next innovation but not
the subsequent ones; see ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) for a more general
formulation.
Let v2;t(i) denote the patent value of the second most recent innovation in
industry i. Because st(i) = st for all i 2 [0; N ], we have v2;t(i) = v2;t in a
symmetric equilibrium. The no-arbitrage condition that determines v2;t is
rt =
st + _v2;t   tv2;t
v2;t
, (22)
which equates the interest rate rt to the rate of return on v2;t given by the sum
of monopolistic prot st, capital gain _v2;t and expected capital loss tv2;t, where
t is the arrival rate of innovation.
Let v1;t(i) denote the patent value of the most recent innovation in industry
i. Because (1  s)t(i) = (1  s)t for all i 2 [0; N ], we also have v1;t(i) = v1;t in
a symmetric equilibrium. The no-arbitrage condition that determines v1;t is
rt =
(1  s)t + _v1;t   t(v1;t   v2;t)
v1;t
, (23)
which equates the interest rate rt to the rate of return on v1;t given by the
sum of monopolistic prot (1   s)t, capital gain _v1;t and expected capital loss
t(v1;t   v2;t), which captures that when the next innovation arrives, the current
entrant becomes the incumbent (i.e., losing v1;t while gaining v2;t).
The rest of the model is the same as in Section 2.2. Using _ct=ct = gt and (6)
in (22), we derive the balanced-growth value of v2;t as
v2;t =
st
+ 
. (24)
Similarly, using _ct=ct = gt and (6) in (23), we derive the balanced-growth value
of v1;t as
v1;t =
(1  s)t
+ 
+

+ 
v2;t =
t
+ 

1  s+ s

+ 

, (25)
where the second equality uses (24). The R&D free-entry condition becomes
tv1;t = Rt ,
'v1;t
Zt
= 1. (26)
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Substituting (25) into (26) yields the following equilibrium condition:
 =
  1

'L
N

1  s+ s

+ 

  , (27)
which also uses (12) and (18). It is useful to note that (27) captures (20) as a
special case with s = 0 and that 
  1 s+s=(+) < 1 due to the discounting
 of backloaded prot st. Here the level of patent breadth  can be greater than
the quality step size z due to the consolidation of market power by the entrant
and the incumbent; see ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) for a discussion.
Figure 1: Unique steady-state equilibrium
Figure 1 plots (27) and shows a unique steady-state equilibrium value of .
The prot share s captures the strength of blocking patents. Stronger blocking
patents (i.e., a larger s) shift down RHS in Figure 1 and reduce the steady-state
arrival rate  of innovation, which in turn leads to a lower steady-state growth
rate g =  ln z. Proposition 2 summarizes this result.
Proposition 2 Economic growth is decreasing in the strength of blocking patents.
This result originates from Chu (2009), which provides a quantitative analysis
on the e¤ects of blocking patents in the Schumpeterian growth model and shows
that reducing the strength of blocking patents causes signicant positive e¤ects on
R&D, economic growth and social welfare. Subsequent studies consider di¤erent
extensions of the Schumpeterian growth model to explore the e¤ects of blocking
patents. Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2012) and Niwa (2016) consider a model with
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both quality improvement and new product development. Chu and Pan (2013)
consider an endogenous step size of quality improvements. Cozzi and Galli (2014)
consider a model with a two-stage cumulative innovation structure (capturing the
basic research stage and the applied development stage). All of these studies nd
that the overall e¤ects of blocking patents on economic growth become inverted-
U under these extensions. Niwa (2018) introduces blocking patents to the model
with endogenous survival investment in Furukawa (2013) and shows that blocking
patents are likely to stimulate (stie) innovation at a high (low) level of patent
breadth. Finally, Yang (2018) explores the optimal coordination of blocking
patents and patent breadth on social welfare.5
2.4 Other patent policy instruments
In addition to patent length, patent breadth and blocking patents, there are
also other patent policy instruments that have been explored in the literature.
ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) introduce the idea of a patentability require-
ment from ODonoghue (1998) to the Schumpeterian growth model with an en-
dogenous quality step size and show that raising the patentability requirement can
stimulate R&D by increasing the step size of quality improvements. In contrast,
Kiedaisch (2015) shows that in a Schumpeterian growth model with persistent
leadership developed by Denicolo (2001), raising the patentability requirement
reduces innovation.
Helpman (1993) models patent protection as a parameter that reduces the
exogenous probability of an imitation process. Kwan and Lai (2003) provide a
quantitative analysis to simulate the dynamic e¤ects of this patent policy para-
meter on economic growth and social welfare. Subsequent studies by Furukawa
(2007) and Horii and Iwaisako (2007) follow this modelling approach of patent
protection against imitation and nd an inverted-U e¤ect of patent protection on
economic growth. Cozzi (2001) and Cozzi and Spinesi (2006) also consider imita-
tion but at the invention stage and model patent protection as an improvement in
intellectual appropriability that reduces the chance of an innovation being stolen
by a competitor before the innovator manages to patent the innovation.
3 Patent policy and inequality
In the previous section, we consider a representative household in the economy.
Therefore, we could not analyze how patent policy a¤ects income inequality. In
5See also Chu and Furukawa (2011) and Yang (2013) for an analysis on the optimal coordi-
nation of patent breadth and a prot-division rule in research joint ventures.
12
this section, we introduce heterogeneous households to the Schumpeterian growth
model as in Chu (2010b) and Chu and Cozzi (2018). Then, we use the model to
explore the e¤ects of patent policy on income inequality.
There is a unit continuum of households indexed by h 2 [0; 1]. Household h
has the following utility function:
U(h) =
Z
1
0
e t ln ct(h)dt, (28)
where  > 0 is the discount rate as before and ct(h) denotes consumption of
household h at time t. The household inelastically supplies L units of labor
for production and maximizes utility subject to the following asset-accumulation
equation:
_at(h) = rtat(h) + wtL  ct(h), (29)
where at(h) is the value of assets owned by household h. As before, rt is the inter-
est rate, and wt is the wage rate. Dynamic optimization yields the consumption
path of household h as
_ct(h)
ct(h)
= rt   , (30)
which shows that all households share the same consumption growth rate (i.e.,
_ct(h)=ct(h) = _ct=ct for all h 2 [0; 1]).
Given the homothetic preference of all households and the absence of idio-
syncratic risk except for the di¤erent levels of initial wealth a0(h), the aggregate
economy behaves as if there is a representative household. Therefore, all the
equilibrium allocations in the previous sections apply to the case of heteroge-
neous households, such that the steady-state arrival rate  of innovation and
the steady-state equilibrium growth rate g are the same as before.
The level of income received by household h at time t is given by
It(h)  rtat(h) + wtL. (31)
Aggregating It(h) across h 2 [0; 1] yields the aggregate level of income It in the
economy. Let SI;t(h)  It(h)=It denote the share of income received by household
h at time t. Then, we have
SI;t(h) =
rtat
rtat + wtL
Sa;t(h) +
wtL
rtat + wtL
, (32)
where Sa;t(h)  at(h)=at denotes the share of wealth owned by household h at
time t. We measure income inequality by the coe¢cient variation of income
dened as
I;t 
sZ 1
0
[SI;t(h)  1]2dh =
rtat
rtat + wtL
a;t, (33)
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where a;t 
qR 1
0
[Sa;t(h)  1]2dh is the coe¢cient variation of wealth at time t.
Chu, Furukawa, Mallick, Peretto and Wang (2020) show that the Gini coe¢cient
of income is also given by the same expression as I;t in (33) when a;t is the Gini
coe¢cient of wealth.
Given a stationary wealth distribution,6 wealth inequality is determined by
the initial wealth distribution that is exogenously given at time 0 (i.e., a;t = a;0).
Therefore, income equality at time t is determined by the endogenous asset-wage
income ratio rtat=(wtL) because wealth inequality drives income inequality in this
model; see Piketty (2014) for evidence on the importance of wealth inequality on
income inequality.
Suppose we focus on the special case without blocking patents (i.e., s = 0).
Then, the value of households assets is simply at = vtN . From (19), the value of
all patented inventions is
vtN =
  1

ZtL
+ 
. (34)
From (11), the wage income is given by
wtL =
yt

=
ZtL

, (35)
which uses L(i) = L=N and (18). Therefore, the asset-wage income ratio is given
by
rtat
wtL
=
rtvtN
wtL
= (+ g)
  1
+ 
. (36)
Substituting (36) and (20) into (33) yields the degree of income inequality as
I;t =

1 +
wtL
rtat

 1
a;0 =

1 +
1
+ g
'L
N

 1
a;0, (37)
where a;0 > 0 is exogenous and g
 =  ln z in which  is determined by (20).
Equation (37) shows that the equilibrium degree of income inequality is in-
creasing in patent breadth  via the following two channels: an increase in the in-
terest rate r = + ln z, and an increase in the asset-wage ratio at=wt = N='.
Chu and Cozzi (2018) refer to these two e¤ects as the interest-rate e¤ect and the
asset-value e¤ect of patent breadth on income inequality. Proposition 3 summa-
rizes this result.
Proposition 3 Income inequality is increasing in the level of patent breadth.
6It can be shown that the aggregate economy in the Schumpeterian growth model in Section
2 always jumps to the balanced growth path, along which the wealth distribution is stationary.
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This result originates from Chu (2010b), which is the rst study that explores
the e¤ects of patent breadth on income inequality in the Schumpeterian growth
model. Chu and Cozzi (2018) extend the analysis to compare the di¤erent e¤ects
of patent breadth and R&D subsidies on income inequality. Both of these studies
nd positive e¤ects of patent breadth on income inequality. However, a recent
study by Chu, Furukawa, Mallick, Peretto and Wang (2020) shows that although
patent breadth  increases income inequality in the short run when the number
of di¤erentiated products N is xed, a larger  reduces income inequality in the
long run when N becomes endogenous.
The intuition of the above result can be explained as follows. A larger patent
breadth attracts the entry of new products and increases the number of di¤erenti-
ated products N(), which in turn exerts a negative dilution e¤ect on the arrival
rate  of innovation in (21) and the interest rate r = + ln z. Chu, Furukawa,
Mallick, Peretto and Wang (2020) show that the negative e¤ect of patent breadth
 on income inequality prevails in the long run in the Schumpeterian growth
model with both quality improvement and new product development in Peretto
(2007). They also provide empirical evidence based on the Ginarte-Park index of
patent rights from Ginarte and Park (1997) to support this theoretical result.
Given the assumption of homothetic preferences in Chu, Furukawa, Mallick,
Peretto and Wang (2020), the aggregate economy continues to be independent of
the income distribution. Kiedaisch (2020) extends the R&D-based growth model
developed by Zweimuller (2000) and Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006), in which the
income distribution a¤ects the aggregate economy due to hierarchic preferences
of heterogeneous households, to explore the e¤ects of patent protection (taking
into account its e¤ects via the income distribution) on economic growth. In
summary, he nds that the overall e¤ect of patent protection on economic growth
is ambiguous and depends on the underlying income distribution.
4 Conclusion
In this survey, we have provided a selective review of the literature on patent
policy and innovation-driven growth. In particular, we have explored the multi-
dimensional nature of the patent system, which features multiple patent policy
instruments such as patent length, patent breadth and blocking patents. We have
used a canonical Schumpeterian growth model to demonstrate the di¤erent e¤ects
of these patent policy instruments on innovation and inequality. Our results
can be summarized as follows. First, extending patent length is ine¤ective in
stimulating R&D. Second, increasing patent breadth may have a positive e¤ect
on innovation but also worsen income inequality. Third, blocking patents are
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detrimental to innovation and economic growth. Finally, it is worth noting that
this survey focuses on the within-country e¤ects of patent policy on domestic
innovation and that there is also a vast literature on the cross-country e¤ects of
patent policy on technology transfer.7
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